By Rahul Mishra and Harshit Prajapati

NEW DELHI, India: At the 2025 Raisina Dialogue, General Romeo Brawner Jr., Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, made a significant statement: Manila is exploring the possibility of including India—and potentially South Korea—in the SQUAD, a nascent minilateral security framework currently comprising the US, Japan, Australia, and the Philippines.

Established in May 2024 in direct response to China's increasingly aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea (SCS), the SQUAD aims to ensure the unimpeded conduct of lawful maritime operations, particularly in contested waters around the Philippines.

Indian defence officials clarified that the matter was not formally tabled during Gen. Brawner’s bilateral meeting with Chief of Defence Staff General Anil Chauhan, India has compelling reasons—both strategic and normative—to pursue membership in the SQUAD.

Four key factors reinforce this imperative, particularly in light of China's expansionist maritime posture and India's evolving Indo-Pacific strategy.

Securing a Stake in South China Sea Security Architecture

India has long established itself as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean Region and has been trying to expand the scope to the wider Indo-Pacific region. Indian Prime Minister Modi’s decision to rechristen the "SAGAR" vision to "MAHASAGAR" during his recent Mauritius visit is a part of that strategy.

However, Beijing's hegemonic military footprints in the SCS and growing maritime presence in the Indian Ocean region present a direct threat to India's strategic interests.

In the SCS, China has transformed at least seven reefs into artificial islands with military infrastructure, including airstrips and radar systems, despite its commitments under the 2002 ASEAN–China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.

A stronger Chinese grip on the SCS enhances Beijing’s ability to dominate key maritime chokepoints like the Strait of Malacca—through which over 80% of China’s oil imports and roughly 55% of India’s trade volume pass. By asserting control over the SCS, China could, in a crisis scenario, impose naval blockades or coercive inspections that would disrupt Indian energy supplies and trade flows.

India also has direct economic interests in the region. ONGC Videsh, India’s overseas oil and gas exploration arm, holds stakes in Vietnam’s offshore blocks located in contested waters. China has repeatedly objected to these operations, citing sovereignty claims that were rejected in the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling.

By joining the SQUAD, India can both safeguard its commercial interests and demonstrate strategic resolve in defending the rules-based maritime order.

Consolidating Strategic Convergence with the Philippines

Despite a history of limited strategic engagement, India-Philippines defence ties have significantly warmed in recent years. The 2022 BrahMos missile deal marked a breakthrough, valued at approximately $375 million—the largest defence export in Indian history.

In early 2025, the Philippines indicated intent to procure additional BrahMos systems, as well as Indian-made Akash surface-to-air missile platforms, reinforcing India’s emergence as a credible regional arms supplier.

In order to boost maritime cooperation, the two nations signed a Memorandum of Understanding in August 2023 to strengthen coast guard coordination and maritime domain awareness.

Joint hydrographic surveys are underway, and naval exercises have begun to take shape. In August 2023, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between the coast guards of both countries to bolster maritime cooperation.

Most notably, India’s 2023 diplomatic endorsement of the 2016 PCA ruling represented a significant shift from its earlier strategic ambiguity on the SCS.

Joining the SQUAD would institutionalize this momentum, creating a platform for regularised maritime coordination, intelligence-sharing, and interoperability—while positioning India as a reliable partner for ASEAN states battling a hegemonic China and its territorial coercions.

While China is and should not be the central driving factor for India-Philippines relations, mutual security concerns and shared interests drive Delhi and Manila closer than ever.  

Strengthening the Hard Security Pillar of India’s Indo-Pacific Vision

Premised on multi-alignment, India’s foreign policy avoids rigid security blocs and favours inclusive regionalism, as reflected in initiatives like SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) and IPOI (Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative).

However, China’s assertive unilateralism—evident in its repeated harassment of Philippine vessels near the Second Thomas Shoal, regular air incursions in Taiwan's airspace, and India's protracted border standoff in Galwan Valley with China has created new realities in the region.

The QUAD, of which India is a founding member, is swiftly mutating from a strategic dialogue into a more security-driven minilateral partnership. Its January 2025 joint statement explicitly condemned "unilateral attempts to alter the status quo by force,” an unmistakable rebuke to China.

Thus, India’s inclusion in the SQUAD would not signify a policy shift but rather a recalibration—blending QUAD’s diplomatic framework with a more tactical, frontline deterrent against Chinese expansionism in maritime Southeast Asia.

Moreover, India's principled stance on freedom of navigation, as expressed through regular deployments under the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness Initiative, aligns squarely with SQUAD's objectives. Delhi’s participation would solidify India’s role as a maritime stabilizer and lend operational depth to its normative advocacy.

Operational Continuity and Strategic Signalling

India’s naval outreach already extends into the South China Sea, through bilateral and multilateral exercises such as the 2019 US-Japan-Philippines-India sail-through, Biennial MILAN exercise, KOMODO (Indonesia), COBRA Gold (Thailand), and bilateral naval exercises with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. These exercises are vital not only for operational readiness but also for political signalling—to reassure regional partners and deter Chinese adventurism.

Beijing frequently labels some of these initiatives as "external interference" and has warned India against “meddling” in the SCS. Yet, India must not let such narratives constrain its maritime diplomacy.

Instead, joining the SQUAD would signal that Delhi is not beholden to Chinese vetoes in its strategic calculus. China’s "String of Pearls" strategy and recent PLA Navy deployments to Gwadar and Djibouti reinforce the idea that maritime security must be addressed as a continuum, not in geographic silos.

The Strategic Payoff of SQUAD Participation

India’s inclusion in the SQUAD offers an opportunity to align its strategic aspirations with operational realities. As China continues to militarise contested waters and intimidate smaller neighbours, Delhi must step up as a credible regional balancer—not just in rhetoric but in terms of presence on the ground.

Participating in the SQUAD would not only safeguard Indian commercial and strategic interests in the SCS but also reinforce the credibility of India’s Indo-Pacific commitments. In an era of coercive statecraft, India cannot afford to be a passive bystander.

*Dr Rahul Mishra is an Associate Professor at the Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India, and a Senior Research Fellow at the German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance, Thammasat University, Thailand.*

*Harshit Prajapati is a doctoral candidate at the Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India.*