Source Think China

SINGAPORE CITY, Singapore: Hu Xijin, former editor-in-chief of Global Times, recently suggested in a blog post that Beijing should intensify pressure on Taiwan’s government, including tightening the military noose around “Taiwan independence forces”. He warned that supporting Washington’s confrontational stance against China would amount to courting disaster. Hu made these remarks while discussing the Trump administration’s demands that other countries restrict trade with China.

In Hu’s view, the US-China trade war has morphed into a geopolitical effort to isolate China, with Taipei fully cooperating by aligning with Washington’s demands. He specifically criticised Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) for shifting its advanced chip production to the US, thereby aiding Washington’s strategic suppression of China through high-tech and economic warfare.

Indeed, many hardliners in China see sacrificing Taiwan as a viable strategy in response to US economic pressure.

Chinese hawks: ‘sacrificing Taiwan’ a viable strategy

Though Beijing is unlikely to adopt Hu’s proposal at the moment, his comments reflect a prevailing sentiment among Chinese hawks. As a seasoned media figure, Hu knows how to channel and inflame public opinion. Indeed, many hardliners in China see sacrificing Taiwan as a viable strategy in response to US economic pressure. They argue that Trump’s tariffs are not just about money but about crippling China’s rise — a view bluntly endorsed by Xia Baolong, the senior official overseeing Hong Kong affairs. Since the US aims to strangle China’s development, China must respond forcefully, and leveraging the Taiwan issue is one of the available options.

In Hu’s words, Taiwan has long served as America’s tool to provoke and contain China. Now, Beijing could turn the tables, using Taiwan to break the US strategic encirclement. By forcing Taipei to abandon its pro-American stance — or even by seizing Taiwan through non-peaceful means — China could establish dominance in East Asia and undermine US containment efforts.

Thus, some hawks are urging Beijing to seize the opportunity created by the tariff war to reclaim Taiwan. They believe Trump’s aggressive tariffs have inadvertently created a rare opening for reunification. Public enthusiasm for a forceful solution is growing.

Almost all the comments under Hu’s post support military action against Taiwan. Discontent with “Taiwan independence” has simmered for years on the mainland, and the hardline stance of Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te has intensified it. By aligning closely with Washington to counter Beijing, Lai has given greater legitimacy to calls for armed reunification.

If not for Beijing’s policy of strategic patience, public opinion might already have pushed China into military conflict. But Beijing’s restraint is not unlimited. Should Taipei’s pro-independence moves convince Beijing that peaceful reunification is hopeless, the leadership may resolve to use force, although the exact timing remains uncertain. The ongoing tariff war could act as a catalyst, influencing Beijing’s calculations in two major ways.

China’s resilience to sanctions is weaker than Russia’s — a point even some Chinese hawks concede. Beijing has long been aware of this vulnerability.

Tariff war could be catalyst forcing China’s hand

First, if the tariff war drags on without resolution, forcing a showdown, then regardless of whether China “wins” or “loses”, Beijing could be pushed toward military action against Taiwan. Beijing’s reluctance to strike is not from fear, but from a desire to minimise the economic and diplomatic costs.

Moscow’s experience with Western sanctions after invading Ukraine served as a preview for China of the likely consequences of a Taiwan operation. Although China’s economy and industrial base are far stronger than Russia’s, it lacks Russia’s relative self-sufficiency in food and energy. China’s food production can barely sustain its population in a crisis, and its energy reserves are inadequate.

Moreover, massive industrial output would suffer under Western sanctions. Factories would scale back or shut down, unemployment would surge, and social unrest could follow. In this sense, China’s resilience to sanctions is weaker than Russia’s — a point even some Chinese hawks concede.

Beijing has long been aware of this vulnerability. In 2020, it launched a “dual circulation” strategy to bolster domestic demand and reduce reliance on foreign trade, partly to prepare for potential conflict and sanctions over Taiwan.

Yet the impact of Trump’s 145% retaliatory tariffs, combined with Chinese countermeasures, already resembles the economic devastation a Taiwan conflict might trigger. Trump has even threatened 150–200% tariffs should China invade Taiwan, but the current rates are approaching that level.

From Beijing’s perspective, if the costs are already being incurred, why not move to achieve national unification?

While tariffs mainly target China’s exports to the US, whereas war would bring broader Western sanctions, the economic damage could still be comparable, especially if secondary tariffs spread beyond the US under Washington pressure, China’s economic shock could mirror the consequences of a Taiwan conflict. From Beijing’s perspective, if the costs are already being incurred, why not move to achieve national unification?

In this sense, the tariff war could be seen as a “stress test” for China’s ability to withstand Western economic pressure in the event of war. If China “loses” the tariff war, it would already have paid a heavy economic price, removing major hesitations about the costs of a military operation. If it wins, it may feel emboldened to resolve the Taiwan issue militarily, seeing that even economic sacrifice failed to force its capitulation.

Strategic calculations

Beyond economic considerations, Beijing also sees strategic and technological advantages in controlling Taiwan. A successful takeover would break the US strategic containment within the first island chain. More crucially, Taiwan’s TSMC controls about 80% of the world’s high-end chip production. Although Washington has pressured TSMC to build plants in the US, replicating Taiwan’s full manufacturing capacity will take years. If Beijing seizes Taiwan, even if TSMC’s facilities are destroyed, the resulting shock to the global semiconductor market would be devastating — hurting the US most. This would give China powerful leverage over the West.

Driven by these motives, it is conceivable that if the tariff war drags on and Beijing assesses that military action could reverse its fortunes, it might indeed take the gamble.

Therefore, the international community should not dismiss remarks like Hu Xijin’s or the broader hawkish rhetoric in China as mere bluster. They reflect not only popular sentiment but also a set of calculations that could become policy. If the tariff war continues for two or three years without easing, and the accumulated pressures severely damage China’s economy, Beijing may well conclude that a bold move over Taiwan is its best or only option.