By Collins Chong Yew Keat

KUALA LUMUR, Malaysia: Chinese President Xi Jinping orchestrated a strategically and purposely intended display of power and diplomacy, from hosting the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Tianjin, to the biggest military parade in Beijing to showcase China’s coming of age to the world.

Both events are well crafted to send a direct show of force to Trump, as a warning to Taiwan, and a subtle warning to other potential adversaries and regional powers that China’s power is unrivalled in the region, and is increasingly toppling the American power.

However, despite efforts to frame this new narrative and to consolidate synergy and strength with new allies in elevating this new world order with China firmly in the lead, deep historical wariness and suspicions and this fragile alliance of convenience will not hold, and the entrenched and proven global order led by the US for more than eight decades will continue to endure.

The SCO summit, the largest ever,  with Xi being true to expectations in rallying powers to “oppose hegemonism” and reject Cold War bloc politics, in a clear rebuke of Trump and the US.

The biggest military parade marking the 80th anniversary of Japan’s WWII surrender, is being crafted to showcase the latest state of the art military hardware and assets from hypersonic missiles to laser weapons and unmanned submarines, all being intended as a stark warning to all including Washington and Taipei.

Deterrence Signals to Taiwan and Trump

The carefully crafted optic is meant to show Xi has powerful friends in his camp, reinforcing China’s claim to great-power leadership. The inclusion of Indonesia and Malaysia as summit guests was also a deliberate move, signaling Beijing’s intent to broaden its influence beyond its core Eurasian partners.

In Xi’s strategic vision, events like the SCO summit and Victory Day parade were more than just commemorations, they were meant to be platforms to consolidate a China-led coalition on the world stage.

This is also seen as a hidden signal even to close allies with Jong-un and Putin attending, that China still has the edge of military capacity  over them, and in the long run, it still has the neighbouring power edge.

While others have pointed out the inaugural show of solidarity with the leaders of China, Russia, and North Korea appeared together in public, this does not necessarily show a long term united front that is ready to sacrifice their own survival risks to fully align with Beijing’s overall position.

A key motive behind Xi’s spectacle has always been to deter Taiwan  from challenging Beijing’s claims, with a show of force meant to deter and discourage Taiwan from using force or declaring independence by showcasing.

By invoking World War II victory, Xi is also reinforcing the historical narrative that China will fight separatism just as it once resisted foreign aggression, which remains a pointed message to Taipei’s leaders that the People’s Liberation Army is prepared to fight if provoked.

Xi’s maneuvers were a direct message to Trump – back off or risk the new move of a new axis of power to jointly resist, and Beijing will not be cowed by Trump’s tariffs and tech sanctions and wanted to demonstrate that China and its friends are prepared to confront U.S. power head-on.

The deterrent signal was twofold: to Taiwan, don’t even think about independence, and to Trump’s America, your containment strategy will fail.

With Us or Against Us

This narrative had an ideological hue that strikes resemblance to the force of choice to the world and a classic “with us or against us” gambit: to align with China’s new bloc or to remain with the US led order.

As Xi has stated in his speech during the parade for the world to choose between peace or war, the stark reality on hand is one that peace is relatively different to one’s own interpretation and ideological bias.

The underlying proposition is: join our new club of power and benefit from Chinese markets, investments, and security partnerships – or side with Washington and risk our displeasure with all the anti China policies espoused by the West.

Modi’s presence and renewed enthusiasm shown towards both Beijing and Moscow has been broadcast as proof and propagandistic win that even traditional US partners are gravitating toward China’s camp. But Modi-Trump ties have never wavered.

Through these moves, Xi is sending a clear signal that China now has the readiness and power capacity to not only rival the US and its order, but to replace it.

The primacy of the SCO is uplifted: representing 43 percent of the world’s population and 23 percent of GDP and this is touted by Chinese media as evidence that the “East” or the “Global South” under Beijing’s leadership can outmatch the West, and contrasting this new model with the so called unfair Western system.

Both SCO and BRICS are touted to offer financing support without the strings attached, a new trade system that can ditch the dollar, and collaborations without the lectures on democracy which are geared to appeal to the players that have been resentful of Western sanctions and human rights obligations.

The underlying threat through this move by Xi in giving the ultimatum is implicit: those who still remain on the fence may eventually be left isolated if China’s bloc gains momentum both in power and efficacy.

Washington sees this new axis of power as a rising real threat to the decades old global peace and stability built and maintained by it, and sees no need for any power to disturb this peaceful dividend that has been enjoyed by the world although Washington did not get the long overdue recognition.

Xi’s Time Trap: The “Peak China” Danger

Xi’s assertive moves are driven by a sense of urgency. China is nearing the apex of its national power and that a window is closing before economic and demographic forces slow its rise.

This Peak China theory, espoused by Michael Beckley and Hal Brands, argued that as a peaking power, China’s meteoric rise is faltering but remains strong enough to be dangerous.

In historical terms, such peaking powers often become more aggressive precisely because they fear future decline. As Beckley argued, when fast-growing great powers suffer a prolonged economic downturn, most crack down at home while expanding abroad to secure their economic lifelines, beat back rivals, and grab territory.

Xi’s current belligerence may reflect a “now or never” mindset, where, facing downturns internally and the closing time frame for it to achieve the 100-Year Marathon, and coupled with Trump’s revival of America, Beijing  might fathom that this is the favorable  window of strategic opportunity to rekindle China’s rise before facing plateau and decline.

Xi’s consolidation of power and foreign policy amplification reflects this peak-power behavior. Domestically, grip has been tightened, and externally, Xi’s China is extending its reach and fast pacing its blue-water navy and military supremacy to secure its expansive claims and to deter American interference, even challenging American interests at its own zones.

All these moves fit the spectrum of what Beckley calls “mercantilist expansion”, in using state power to gain resources and military footholds and presence globally as a fallback for its slowing growth at home.

The act of confidence and boldness might not be what they seem. Xi’s China is also acting out of strategic anxiety, realising that its best chance to reshape the world order is now, before its relative power declines and before the US retains its large portion of the power gap under Trump.

Fault Lines in Xi’s Bloc: Mutual Distrust and Marriage of Convenience

The coalition that Xi is trying to hold together is tied by convenience rather than true consensus where they have divergent interests and deep historical mistrust of each other, and of China. For all the smiles in Tianjin and Beijing, significant fault lines run beneath the surface.

Despite Xi’s efforts to court Modi, both know of the underlying wariness. Beijing and Delhi fought a border war in 1962 and exchanged deadly clashes as recently as 2020 in the Himalayas.

India harbours deep suspicions about China’s strategic intentions, resenting Beijing’s support for Pakistan and its encroachments via the Belt and Road projects near India’s sphere with its String of Pearls containment of India.

Modi and Xi’s brief rapprochement  was driven by immediate pressure, Trump’s tariffs and US snubs, rather than a lasting realignment. New Delhi will remain steadfast to its long held strategic autonomy and will have no intent to become a secondary junior partner to China.

The same goes for Moscow-Beijing ties.  Historically, Russia has been uneasy about China’s rise especially along their long Siberian border and in Central Asia, coupled with historical Cold War wariness and tensions.

Today, Russia is effectively the junior partner where its economy and technology are increasingly dependent on China.

Putin needs Xi’s support to resist Western sanctions, yet the Kremlin is well aware of the limitations and is cautious not to be overly beholden to Beijing.

Russia maintains a strong defense partnership with India and sells advanced weapons to New Delhi, reflecting Moscow’s desire to hedge against total reliance on China.

Moscow is in fact more trustful of Delhi than Beijing, and this goes way back during the Cold War too.

Competition between Moscow and Beijing has also been growing, with fighting of influence in Central Asia, competition for Arctic ambitions, and the jostle for arms sales globally.

Trust only goes so far, where although Moscow and Beijing share a common adversary in Washington, they do not share an alliance treaty despite the No Limits Ties and each would most likely abandon the other if their core interests clash or when national survival calls for so.

Moscow still sees Beijing as a potential future threat and vice versa.

The same goes for North Korea. It owes its survival in part to Chinese patronage and support, but Pyongyang has been fiercely guarding its independence and has often defied Beijing’s wishes.

Jong un’s rare visit to stand with Xi and Putin in Beijing and to show solidarity was a propaganda win for Beijing, yet Pyongyang’s loyalty is not guaranteed and not confirmed.

Historically, we have seen how different contextual fears and changing needs played out.

Pyongyang has also played China and the Soviet side against each other for its own benefits.

Pakistan might be growing in importance to China, with Beijing’s vast investments there, but even Islamabad has often sought US aid and cannot afford to alienate Washington in total.

Central Asian states in the SCO also do have their own wariness in their policy calculations, balancing between Moscow’s security umbrella and China’s economic heft, all while being cautious to secure their own national interest calculations.

Many of them also are wary of the debt-heavy infrastructure deals of China and its growing presence.

SCO's Trust Gap

The SCO lacks the binding commitments and frameworks like other official alliances, and it is not a full fledged security or economic alliance.

The SCO charter avoids military alliance obligations, focusing more on vague cooperation against terrorism, and focusing on economic links, and political dialogue.

Despite the close friendships tied by ideology and a common threat of Washington, if conflicts break out over Taiwan or in the South China Sea, there is no guarantee that Russia or Iran would provide support.

SCO remains a platform for photo-ops and for a common venting ground against the West, and it stops at that.

Most of the players that are apparently friendly with Beijing are hedging carefully and aware of the consequences, rather than fully committing themselves.

The Global South countries would not want to send a wrong message to Beijing by not attending, but most of them are still courting both sides in their hedging game, still wary of Beijing’s expansive and bellicose claims on the disputed regions in an increasing show of might but still in need for its economic and market dependency.

Xi’s coalition and the SCO lack the deep underlying trust and institutional cohesion beyond economic measures alone, unlike the Western frameworks that have both security, values and economic fronts that bind and endure.

*Collins Chong Yew Keat is a foreign affairs and strategy analyst and author in University of Malaya.*