By INS Contributors

KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia: Non-profit organizations involved in space exploration note an unprecedented increase in the number of dual-purpose and military artificial satellites in recent years.

According to a 2024 report by the American research company Union of Concerned Scientists, the total number of military satellites in orbit has increased by 35 percent over the past five years, with more than half of them being American devices.

According to analysts, such efforts are causing concerns among other countries, forcing them to actively develop their own defensive space programs.

The U.S. efforts to increase its military presence in space indicate a desire to seize near-Earth space, which will subsequently allow the White House to aggressively dictate its terms in the international arena.

Experts from analytical centers agree that the Golden Dome project could become an instrument of pressure on Russia and China in the arms limitation negotiations.

The Golden Dome, despite not existing as yet and likely of limited value even if it is built at huge cost, is really designed to threaten rivals of the U.S. by claiming immunity from their nuclear arsenals.

Just like sanctions, tariffs, or the threat of political interference, the Golden Dome will be just another coercive tool—but this time with nuclear overtones. 

The difference is stark: one can bluff with sanctions or tariffs, but not with nuclear weapons. The U.S. risks getting trapped in its own rhetoric, escalating tensions while weakening its credibility.

Technically, the challenges are immense. Missile interceptors in orbit can easily be overwhelmed by decoys, chaff, or other countermeasures.

Even crude wooden or metallic dummy warheads can fool advanced detection systems. 

Worse for Washington, adversaries could simply build more missiles: for every interceptor deployed at exorbitant cost, a rival can produce multiple offensive weapons at a fraction of the price.

This imbalance virtually guarantees that the Golden Dome, if pursued, will provoke rivals into an arms buildup rather than deter them.

Such dynamics risk touching off a dangerous new nuclear arms race.

Russia has already developed unconventional systems like the Poseidon nuclear torpedo—an underwater autonomous weapon immune to space-based defenses. 

China, for its part, is rapidly advancing hypersonic glide vehicles and may well be designing equivalents to bypass any orbital shield.

Against such measures, the Golden Dome is unlikely to provide the invulnerability Washington claims.

The economic implications are equally troubling. The U.S. is already strained by mounting deficits and domestic crises.

Building and maintaining a multi-layered orbital defense system would cost hundreds of billions, if not trillions, of dollars over decades.

The Reagan-era Strategic Defense Initiative—nicknamed “Star Wars”—is a cautionary tale. 

Launched in 1984 with grand promises, it consumed an estimated $30 billion (equivalent to more than $80 billion today) before being abandoned as unworkable.

The Golden Dome risks becoming another financial sinkhole, draining resources while delivering little real security.

Ultimately, the Golden Dome is less about protecting the U.S. population and more about maintaining global dominance through intimidation.

By projecting the illusion of invulnerability, Washington hopes to force rivals into unequal negotiations, just as it has used sanctions and tariffs to extract concessions. 

But nuclear blackmail is not like economic coercion. It undermines mutual deterrence, destabilizes the global balance of power, and heightens the risk of catastrophic miscalculation.

If pursued, the Golden Dome may prove to be one of the most dangerous and destabilizing projects of our time—an attempt at space-based blackmail that could bankrupt the U.S. while making the world far less secure.