By Alan Ting

KOTA KINABALU, Malaysia: Former President Donald Trump’s recent call for Washington to reclaim Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan as a means to threaten China is a textbook example of how U.S. policy towards Beijing has drifted into strategic foolishness. 

It is a gesture that ignores history, overstates capability, and underlines the lack of a coherent framework for containing China in 2025. The United States already had its opportunity. Between 2001 and 2021, it occupied Afghanistan at extraordinary human and financial cost. 

Bagram was the beating heart of its military presence in the country, hosting tens of thousands of troops and serving as a hub for air power and logistics. 

If Washington was serious about using Afghanistan as a pressure point against Beijing, it could have attempted so during those two decades. It did not. Instead, it squandered its presence in a futile counterinsurgency campaign that collapsed into humiliation when the Taliban swept back into power. 

To imagine that Afghanistan, under Taliban control, would now invite U.S. forces back to Bagram is delusion bordering on fantasy. 

Even if Kabul were pliable, which it manifestly is not, the regional logistics that once sustained America’s Afghan war machine are gone.

Pakistan has no desire to serve as a corridor for U.S. forces and equipment, having tilted decisively towards China. The Central Asian republics, too, are either too dependent on Moscow and Beijing or too wary of domestic backlash to play host again. 

The entire supply chain that once propped up the U.S. presence is permanently broken. Attempting to rebuild it would not only be exorbitantly expensive, but also strategically untenable. 

Meanwhile, Washington continues to tie itself down in Europe, pouring vast resources into Ukraine. That fixation has come at the expense of facing up to the realities of competition with China. 

Unlike Russia, China has the ability to strike at the heart of U.S. economic and technological strength by withholding strategic materials such as rare earths and specialised magnets. These are not obscure commodities. 

They are essential inputs for semiconductors, electric vehicles, wind turbines, precision-guided munitions, stealth aircraft, and virtually every platform the U.S. military relies on to maintain technological superiority. 

Beijing controls not only the largest reserves but also the refining capacity, giving it the power to weaponise supply chains at will. This economic leverage is paired with a military build-up of historic proportions. 

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is now the world’s largest fleet by number of hulls, expanding rapidly with new destroyers, aircraft carriers, and amphibious assault ships. 

Its missile forces are explicitly designed to keep U.S. assets at bay, with hypersonic systems and long-range anti-ship weapons capable of striking deep into the Pacific. 

Its air force has fielded stealth fighters in meaningful numbers and is rapidly integrating drones and artificial intelligence (AI) into combat doctrine. 

The clear emphasis is on projecting power into Taiwan and Southeast Asia, denying the U.S. military the freedom of action it once took for granted. 

This is the real challenge, not a fantasy of reoccupying an abandoned base in Central Asia. Washington cannot afford to ignore the hard realities of an adversary that combines economic coercion, technological catch-up, and rapid military modernisation. 

If Washington genuinely wishes to interdict and disrupt China, Afghanistan is the wrong theatre. 

The real frontline lies further east, in Southeast Asia. The countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are emerging as China’s strategic near abroad. The region has become an essential node in Beijing’s economic and industrial architecture. 

Chinese firms are laundering manufactured goods through ASEAN to circumvent tariffs, while several member states increasingly resemble satellite economies of Beijing. It is here, not in the dust of Bagram, that the contest for influence will be decided. 

Yet Washington has failed to match words with deeds. Of the ten ASEAN members, only the Philippines and Singapore remain dependable allies. 

The rest adopt either a studied neutrality or, in some cases, active hostility towards U.S. positions. This reflects years of U.S. neglect and inconsistency. 

While China has courted governments with infrastructure projects, investment, and diplomatic engagement, the U.S. has too often been absent, distracted, or reliant on outdated talking points. 

If the U.S. wants to compete effectively, it must focus squarely on ASEAN. That means sustained government-to-government engagement, not one-off summits or token gestures. 

It requires building serious economic alternatives to Chinese financing and demonstrating that the U.S. presence brings concrete benefits to local populations. 

Equally important, Washington must master the art of information operations. Public opinion in much of Southeast Asia has been softened by Chinese narratives that portray Beijing as a benign partner and the U.S. as a destabilising outsider. 

Unless these perceptions are challenged, governments will continue to drift towards China regardless of private misgivings. 

The strategic value of having friendly ASEAN states willing to host U.S. military assets is immense. Naval facilities in Southeast Asia would allow the U.S. to project power deep into the South China Sea, where Beijing has already militarised disputed islands and asserts unlawful claims. 

Ground-based missile deployments in the region could complicate Chinese planning and provide credible deterrence against coercion.

Such positioning would also reassure partners like the Philippines, who face direct Chinese pressure, and reinforce freedom of navigation in one of the world’s most vital trade arteries. This is where America’s energies should be concentrated. 

Rather than chasing the ghosts of Bagram, U.S. policy must recognise that the Indo-Pacific is the decisive arena of competition.

Attempts to revive an Afghan presence only highlight the absence of a clear strategy. China is not threatened by U.S. nostalgia for abandoned bases. 

It is threatened by a confident U.S. that can rally partners, shape public opinion, and establish a durable military and economic footprint in Southeast Asia. 

For now, Washington’s fixation on Afghanistan reveals a rudderless containment policy torn between symbolic theatrics, a draining war in Europe, and hard realities in Asia. 

The longer the U.S. avoids making hard choices about prioritising the Indo-Pacific, the more Beijing will consolidate its gains. Strategic foolishness may make headlines, but it does not win competitions.

*Alan Ting is an observer of regional affairs and global geopolitics based in the Land Below the Wind.*