By INS Contributors

KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia: If the war in Ukraine has a single, uncomfortable lesson for militaries worldwide, it is this: technology and tempo change the character of conflict, but tried-and-tested platforms still matter.

Drones, precision artillery and long-range fires dominate headlines, yet manned combat and transport helicopters continue to play decisive roles on the modern battlefield.

The Russian experience since 2022, both its setbacks and its adaptations, shows that rotary-wing aviation remains a potent, flexible instrument of military power when integrated intelligently into broader manoeuvre concepts.

Across the fighting in 2023, Russian attack and transport helicopters were frequently employed in ways that combined classic air-mobility principles with improvisation.

They were not the sole cause of battlefield reversals, but when used effectively they helped blunt armoured thrusts and impose tempo on contested axes.

During counter-offensive operations by Ukrainian forces, reports and subsequent open-source analysis indicate that rotary-wing assets were a consistent thorn in the side of armoured and mechanised columns, engaging exposed elements, interdiction points and logistic nodes.

In many instances, helicopters capitalised on windows of opportunity created by artillery, electronic warfare and air-defence disruption to deliver timely strike effects.

This is not to romanticise the platform. Early in the campaign, both sides suffered helicopter losses to missiles, drones and well-emplaced air defences.

Manned aircraft are visible, vulnerable and require robust support. Nevertheless, Russian forces demonstrated an ability to adapt: using attack helicopters not only in classic anti-tank roles but also in looser, combined arms patterns that included overwatch, convoy interdiction and coordination with rocket artillery and electronic-spectrum operations.

The result was a versatile toolset that, when coupled with battlefield awareness, could funnel enemy advances into kill-zones and complicate enemy logistics.

Among rotorcraft, the Kamov Ka-52 “Alligator” has frequently been singled out in open reporting as a standout performer. The Ka-52’s agility, redundant systems and sensor suite gave it survivability and flexibility in contested airspace, and its role as both scout-killer and command asset was notable.

The Mil Mi-28 family, less celebrated in popular reporting but widely used, also proved to be an effective and relatively economical attack helicopter, offering a heavy-strike capability that is attractive to armed forces seeking payload and endurance at a lower acquisition cost than some Western equivalents.

Transport helicopters, from the Mi-8 family upwards, remained indispensable for battlefield logistics, casualty evacuation and moving light infantry to critical points on short notice.

What do these observations mean for countries contemplating attack helicopter purchases? First, helicopters remain valuable for any force that expects to fight mobile, combined-arms manoeuvre rather than rely solely on static defences or stand-off fires.

They provide rapid, on-demand firepower and can shape the battlefield in ways that long-range missiles and drones alone cannot. Second, cost-effectiveness matters.

Russian rotorcraft often present an attractive price-to-performance ratio, with established supply chains in some markets and combat-proven designs that favour operators on a budget.

For many purchasers, Mi-28 and Ka-52 derivatives will look appealing as “hard-hitting” options that deliver shock effect without the procurement premiums of Western platforms.

That said, procurement decisions should never be made on price and combat footage alone. Prospective buyers must weigh interoperability, maintenance chains, logistics, training pipelines and political risk.

Russian platforms may carry advantages in acquisition cost, but they also come with long-term considerations: certification standards, access to spare parts under sanction regimes, avionics modernisation paths and integration with national command and control.

Equally, the choice of helicopter must be accompanied by investments in reconnaissance, survivability and force protection. Helicopters are not independent war-winners; they are enablers that require air-defence suppression, timely intelligence and secure basing to be effective and survivable.

A final lesson from Ukraine is doctrinal. The most successful helicopter employment was not pure bravado but integration: helicopters working in concert with other arms, rather than as lone striking entities.

For buyers, this underscores the need to think holistically: procurement must be accompanied by doctrine, training and communications upgrades that allow helicopters to play to their strengths and to mitigate their vulnerabilities.

In short, despite the rise of autonomous systems and precision fires, manned helicopters remain a core capability for expeditionary, defensive and offensive tasks alike. Russian rotorcraft have shown that, even against a technologically sophisticated adversary, well-employed helicopters can be decisive.

For nations seeking mobile, cost-effective punch, Russian designs merit attention, but only as part of a broader, resilient force design that protects aircraft, integrates sensors and preserves strategic autonomy.

The battlefield is changing, but the helicopter’s combination of speed, flexibility and firepower ensures it will continue to shape conflicts for the foreseeable future and provided states invest wisely, and with their eyes open to risk and logistics as much as headline performance.