By Collins Chong Yew Keat

KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia: The announcement of a two-sided, two-week ceasefire between the United States and Iran marks a much-needed turn of events that will pave the way for future long-term peace and de-escalations.

It remains a historic inflection point in a conflict that has threatened to escalate into an all-out war. It was a culmination of a high-stakes strategy of coercive bargaining phase by the Trump administration and a pragmatic pivot by a transition-state Iranian leadership.

While the escalate-to-deescalate strategy has yielded the a temporary truce for now, the risks ahead remain wide if interpretations remain vague and risks of outside interference remain unopposed.

Already, differences in the case of attacks in Lebanon, free passage in Hormuz and rights to uranium enrichment have already triggered tests to the truce limit, compounded by systemic distrust.

Trump has indicated that the coercive diplomatic phase is still in force, and with all U.S. With military forces and assets still in place and operating in wartime mode until a full agreement is reached and fully complied with, Trump continues the model of negotiating from maximum pressure. He maintains a force structure needed to compel Tehran to act while showing readiness to absorb the asymmetric costs, and he also maintains a strategic exit and lifeline for Tehran by offering the prospect of long-term economic redevelopment, rebuilding, and sanctions relief.

The next two-week window frame will be the most consequential and critical period to move towards a lasting peace deal, or to risk the whole saga to collapse into a protracted conflict again, and this is when the need to prevent saboteurs or provocateurs out to undermine the truce has never been higher.

It is thus vital to build on this next phase of critical period in sustaining the momentum of confidence building measures, and both sides have shown willingness and restraint in not wanting to escalate further, cognisant that the escalate-to-deescalate calculus is not meant to be a sustained model, lest inviting miscalculations and a narrowing path for a face-saving exit.

The initial 15-point proposal and the 10-point counteroffer are characterised by a mix of face-saving rhetoric and deep structural demands.

The Core Strategic Dilemma: Uranium, Leverage and Reconstruction

A critical point of contention within the 10-point plan is the status of Iran’s nuclear program, and this will need wise and meticulous deliberation from both sides during this two-week period.

Washington would not want this to be totally let free for Tehran to have the rights to keep and develop its uranium stockpile, as this will be tantamount to a futile effort to commence the conflict in the first place, and in Washington’s perspective, this will create a new loop all over again where Tehran might have the capacity to once again enrich and develop greater volume in the future. 

For Tehran, giving up the uranium leverage entirely will weaken its future bargaining chips and losing its core strategic ambiguity card entirely, but also well aware that a flexible and tactical embrace of a better deal in a quid pro quo in exchange for sanctions relief and a future assurance of prohibition of strikes on the country will benefit it more.

Tehran will also consider the post-Trump era and potential policy changes under a different administration, especially a Democratic one, and how adjustments for that period  will need structural changes from now. However, Tehran remains tied to present realities: securing the best bargains, preserving domestic legitimacy and projecting strength. Simultaneously, it demands sufficient reparations and reconstruction funding, either through Hormuz toll charges or compensation from Washington.

The Trump administration on its part, is also cognisant of the big opening here in changing the economic and geopolitical equation in the region, in the form of renewed peace and a possible change of intent and direction from Tehran, now that Trump has stated that almost all of the original objectives of the conflict have been achieved, chief of that is to deny the nuclear ambition and to degrade the naval, missile and drone capacity of Iran.

During the short-term rebuilding period, Iran will need capital. While direct reparations from Washington remain unlikely, this capital could come in different forms, such as sanctions relief or Washington encouraging regional allies to provide support through normalising economic and trade volume with Iran.

For now, Iran will need capital reassurance, and that will be assured more effectively in the form of the proposal demand for transit fees in the Strait of Hormuz, in which it was suggested that it will be shared with Oman.

From Tehran’s perspective, these fees are necessitated by the war damages. By charging approximately $1 per barrel of oil, calculations for a Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) carrying 2 million barrels will amount to USD2milliion per tanker. While sparking concerns among net oil importers like Japan and South Korea, the potential for permanent high freight rates and insurance costs remains a long-term risk.

The “toll charges” have been framed by some as challenging the fundamental principle of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which guarantees unimpeded transit passage through international straits. Despite that, if this is the cost needed to pave the way for lasting peace, it could permanently alter the legal and economic landscape of global maritime commerce.

Risks to Truce and the Pressures on Both Sides

Some risks remain for the truce, and these include sabotage risks by others out to derail the path to peace.  The "Lebanon Gap" issue still persists, specifically regarding how Iran might continue to double down to include Lebanon as part of the truce or to embrace flexibility.

The Uranium ultimatum is another dilemma for Tehran, failing which the U.S. will consider further actions to secure it by any means necessary, and risks a collapse of the deal.

While Trump called Iran’s 10-point proposal a "workable basis," he has insisted the final deal must align with his own 15-point plan, which mandates an absolute end to all enrichment and the removal of all nuclear infrastructure. This mismatch will mean that the two-week window will see the continuation of coercive bargaining.

Ultimately, the success of this objective depends on whether the Iranian leadership feels the threat of the total destruction of their civilian infrastructure - is more dangerous than the domestic humiliation and backlash of handing over their nuclear "deterrent. While the markets have rallied on the hope of peace, the actual terms regarding uranium disposal remain the most likely flashpoint for a resumption of hostilities.

Success depends on whether Iran can maintain restraint and provide a continuous "off-ramp" for U.S. forces, and whether the U.S. can accept a "face-saving exit" that maintains its deterrence credibility while allowing Iran enough funding for its rebuilding process.

Domestic pressures are also being felt both in Tehran and Washington. In the U.S., the Trump administration faces criticism from both the "America First" wing and traditional hawks on the necessity of the war and the economic and image implications on the U.S.

In Iran, the transition of power to Mojtaba Khamenei and the death of Ali Khamenei have disrupted institutional balance, leading to friction between the "pragmatic" camp, which favours the ceasefire to ensure regime survival, and the hardline "Axis of Resistance" commanders who view the 10-point plan as a baseline for further escalation.

Tehran is also preserving a fallback leverage in imposing the notion that reopening of the Strait of Hormuz is subject to "technical limitations" and requires coordination with the Iranian armed forces. This language provides Tehran with a legalistic off-ramp to re-close the strait at any moment if the talks do not yield the desired concessions on sanctions relief or the release of frozen assets.

The April 10 Test and the Search for a Lasting Peace

This ceasefire is hugely pivotal for the first step towards a lasting cessation of hostility, but it continues to rest on a foundation of profound distrust and structural incompatibility.

The "escalate to de-escalate" strategy achieved the U.S. primary tactical goal: the cessation of a maritime blockade and the degradation of the IRGC's ability to wage conventional war. However, Tehran still retains a considerable amount of leverage and subsequent talks in Islamabad will be crucial in gauging the threshold of acceptance and flexibility by both sides in preventing further losses, claiming strategic victories in their own perspectives while maintaining strength projection and a face-saving exit without being seen as weak.

The talks that will begin on April 10 will be the true test of whether the Trump administration can translate its current state of conflict into a sustainable peace that does not inadvertently embolden China or in risking the original objectives being made obsolete, while maintaining the need to give Tehran the space needed for its own pathway of peace and support needed for reconstruction. 

For Tehran, it will be a strategic internal dilemma on whether the cost of flexible trade-offs will be worth either a long term new era of peace in the region for a new economic reset, or to continue the asymmetric and conventional model of resistance that might risks a new cycle of prolonged confrontation.

The world watches Islamabad with a mix of relief and trepidation and the two-week window is a transition into a more complex, diplomatic theatre of war. 

This opening must be seized for peace and that it can still  be salvaged. All hope is for a peaceful, long-term, and comprehensive end to this conflict for the sake of humanity and the world.

*Collins Chong Yew Keat is a foreign affairs and strategy analyst and author in University of Malaya.*