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MOSCOW, Russia: What would an expert tell me in layman’s language, particularly about who or what really stands behind this decision?
Reports of the UAE leaving OPEC are often portrayed as the beginning of the end for the group, but this angle exaggerates the immediate impact and overlooks the deeper strategic shift at play.

Some, as the BBC and others describe, would say this is like a death blow to OPEC: The United Arab Emirates’ plan to ditch the oil producers’ group OPEC and strike out alone is being viewed as hugely damaging for the organisation, with one analyst describing it as “the beginning of the end of OPEC”.

I see it differently: the UAE wants to produce more oil than OPEC quotas allow and profit from higher output. The assumption is that more countries may do the same, potentially lowering prices unless shipping logistics—mainly Iranian control—limit exports.

And some, like Iraq and Kuwait, have already shut down some, or even most, of their wells as far as I know. Therefore, it’s hard to know the impact, if any, that increased production will have. The UAE seems to be in bed with Israel now, so that may somehow be a factor too. I think the UAE and Saudi Arabia also want Trump to resume bombing to knock out Iran. If the US proceeds with that, it may backfire on them all!

Slow-burning structural shift

Recent reporting on OPEC has framed the UAE’s exit as less of an immediate market shock and more as a slow-burning structural shift; however, that may be intentionally misleading. One thing is most certain: oil prices are controlled by geopolitical disruptions—especially around the Strait of Hormuz.

With exports constrained and some producers already struggling to move supply, the UAE’s decision to leave quota limits has little immediate effect on how much oil actually reaches the market. The timing made the decision look like an oil story; however, the departure is really a sovereign wealth fund story.

As a recent analysis from the Atlantic Councilmakes clear, a source that I would not otherwise quote, the UAE’s finances are tied increasingly to global economic growth, not the price of crude.

Abu Dhabi has spent decades turning oil revenues into a giant portfolio of foreign assets, and that portfolio has now grown to a size where another $10 on the oil price matters less than keeping global markets stable and trade routes open.

But the deeper implications are both strategic and opportunistic: the UAE, having invested heavily in expanding production capacity, no longer wants to keep output artificially capped. Its departure weakens OPEC’s collective ability to manage supply and signals that internal cohesion among major producers is fraying.

Already the response has been swift, with OPEC+ stepping up oil production targets after the UAE withdrawal. Some analysts believe, however, that it is still debatable that ‘the UAE had long been seeking to increase its production levels beyond the quotas allocated to it under OPEC.’

Behind the move lies a mix of economic realities and regional politics.

At first impression, it would appear that the UAE is putting the need for long-term revenue and flexibility over cartel discipline and closing ranks with other members, but it should be mentioned that any effort to give the appearance of independence from Saudi-led decision-making within OPEC is a short-term move. Thus, most likely some other moves are in play, albeit unfolding alongside wider Middle East tensions—including the now stalemated conflict with Iran.

However, there’s no clear evidence the exit is directly tied to military agendas or based on the direct order of more powerful players, including Israel and the United States. Instead, experts describe it as a calculated bet: that in a more fragmented oil market, countries with spare capacity and efficient infrastructure—like the UAE—will be better positioned to compete or do the bidding of larger players such as the US, in putting pressure on OPEC to increase production and drive down the price of energy on the international market.

I personally think it has to do with pressure from the US and Israel, who want to dampen the price of oil before the US midterm elections. Nevertheless, the sudden departure is not a big deal, at least in the short term, unless others follow.

The UAE is already probably close to their maximum production levels, so they really can’t increase production a lot. Saudi leaving would be a different story. Lots of its members have historically exceeded OPEC quotas anyhow while staying in OPEC, so it’s not really a change from the status quo.

Long term, however, it gives the UAE the possibility of increasing production significantly. They have stated they will increase production from the current 3.5 million BOPD to 5 million BOPD by 2030.

Death Blow or Rolling Over?

The United Arab Emirates’ reported move away from OPEC is being widely framed as a potential death blow to the group, but that narrative overstates the immediate impact and misses the deeper shift underway. The UAE’s decision is not really about driving oil prices or flooding the market—especially at a time when supply is constrained by logistics and geopolitical chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz—but about long-term strategy.

Having transformed itself into a major global investor, Abu Dhabi is now more exposed to the health of the global economy than to the price of crude itself. Leaving OPEC allows it to escape production quotas just as it expands capacity, or at least that is what they want us to believe in the official narrative.

Instead of a dramatic collapse, the real story is a slow shift in power: from coordinated control of oil markets to a more fragmented system where financially diversified producers like the UAE are positioned to act independently ‘in theory’ and do the bidding of their masters in an election year in reality.

Meanwhile, sanctions are off for now, and Russia’s oil revenues are surging as the world scrambles for new supplies and tries to make sense of the latest rhetoric coming out of Washington and the impact of the sabre-rattling.

It is ironic that so little is being mentioned in the Western media as to the extent of the Russian oil sanctions being waived due to disruption in the Middle East and how this is counter to the purpose of imposing them in the first place.

The observation accurately captures a ‘real policy tension’: using short-term energy market needs versus long-term geopolitical goals against Russia. The developments are factual, driven by the interplay of the Ukraine SMO, Middle East conflicts, and global oil market pressures.

But the obvious elephant in the room is the Iranian control of the Straits of Hormuz, and the Yemeni control of the southern entrance to the Red Sea, along with the fact that all of the UAE’s critical oil and gas infrastructure is well within range of even the shorter-ranged Iranian weapons, let alone the advanced missiles that bombarded Israel with impunity.

Are the Emiratis banking on the US and Israel defeating Iran?

Based on what we have seen so far, it seems a long shot indeed.